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ABSTRACT 
Exploring Figurative Language Processing in Bilinguals: 
 The Metaphor Interference Effect. (December 2003) 
Francisco Emigdio Martinez, Jr., B.A., Texas A&M International University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyotsna Vaid 
 
 
 
 While studies suggest that figurative, or non-literal, meanings are automatically activated 
in single language users, little is known about how language proficiency may influence the 
automaticity of non-literal meaning activation. The present research sought to address this issue 
by comparing figurative language activation in Spanish-English bilinguals. An interference 
paradigm (Glucksberg, Gildea & Bookin, 1982) was used in which participants were to judge the 
literal truth or falsity of statements of the form Some Xs are Ys. Judgments on this task are 
typically slower to statements that, though literally false, are metaphorically true (e.g., Some 
lawyers are sharks), suggesting that metaphorical meanings are non-optionally activated (at least 
in single language users). The present research involved four experiments: Experiment 1 
conducted with English-speaking monolinguals, replicated the metaphor interference effect; in 
Experiment 2 the effect was replicated in English-dominant and in balanced bilinguals tested 
only in English. Experiment 3 conducted with bilinguals tested in both languages, showed that 
the metaphor interference effect was not obtained in either language in English-dominant 
bilinguals and was obtained in Spanish only in the balanced group. The findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2 support the view that nonliteral (metaphoric) meanings are automatically 
accessed in monolinguals and bilinguals alike. Experiment 3 involved a fewer number of 
metaphor trials per language, raising the possibility that this procedural difference may have led 
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to a weakening of the metaphor interference effect. This possibility was directly tested in 
Experiment 4, conducted with English-speaking monolinguals presented with the same number 
of metaphor trials as the bilinguals in Experiment 3. The results showed a clear metaphor 
interference, even with the reduced number of trials. As such, the findings of Experiment 3, 
where a metaphor interference effect was obtained only for Spanish items, are somewhat 
equivocal: at face value, they suggest that the effect is modulated by language proficiency. 
Alternatively, the metaphor interference effect may turn out to be present in both languages, but 
may simply have been obscured by variability owing to the small sample size per language order. 
Which of these two interpretations turns out to be valid will depend on additional testing. 
Implications of the present findings for theories of the organization of the bilingual 
representational system are addressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Figurative language refers to phrases or expressions in which the intended meaning is 
independent of and typically not directly computable from the literal meaning of the constituent 
elements. As Katz (1996) notes, “[I]n the broadest sense, an utterance can be understood as 
figurative when the expressed meaning differs from the meaning one intends to convey” (p 18). 
For example, the statement, That salesman is a bulldozer, describes a salesman in terms of a 
word normally denoting a piece of machinery. The intended meaning of the phrase requires 
listeners to go beyond the surface meaning and make certain inferences regarding the similarity 
between the qualities of the salesman and the features of a bulldozer, e.g., its weight, its 
aggressiveness, etc. The particular non-literal meanings that are foregrounded may vary and are 
likely to be decided with reference to context. Figurative language may be contrasted with literal 
uses of language in which the meaning of an utterance is derivable directly from the meaning of 
its elements (cf. Ariel, 2002). 
Mastery of appropriate use of figurative expressions in a second language (L2) has been 
acknowledged to be one of the greatest challenges for second language learners. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, empirical investigations of L2 figurative language use have been guided 
largely by pedagogical concerns surrounding the appropriate use of humor (Deneire, 1995; 
Schmitz, 2002), irony, sarcasm, idioms (Cooper, 1999), metaphor (Danesi, 1992), and other 
forms of figurative expressions in a second language context. Hardly any psycholinguistic-
oriented research has been conducted on figurative language processing or representation in 
bilingual or multiple language users. The present research sought to fill this gap. Before turning 
______________ 
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to the present research, a review of central psycholinguistic issues in figurative language 
processing is provided. 
Figurative Language: Peripheral vs. Central? 
Empirical studies of figurative language processing have been characterized by two 
differing theoretical positions with respect to the role of figurative language in linguistic 
expression or conceptualization. An early prevailing view regarded literal forms of language as 
central, with non-literal forms serving essentially stylistic or pragmatic functions (Grice, 1975).  
In contrast, an alternative vew (e.g., Lakoff & Turner, 1980; Gibbs, 1994) claims that non-literal 
forms of language are central to linguistic expression and thought and regards these forms as 
autonomous, i.e., non-derivative from literal meaning.  
In the former view, figurative language is characterized as an additional layer of meaning 
that embellishes the literal level (Billow, 1977) but is not crucial to conveying the central 
meaning, which was thought to be sufficiently represented by a literal level. Consistent with this 
view of figurative language as peripheral, early models of figurative language comprehension, 
such as the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979), posited that each utterance is 
initially analyzed for its literal meaning and that only when a literal meaning is unavailable or 
otherwise inappropriate contextually is a non-literal meaning sought. In the standard view, then, 
figurative language comprehension occurs only after an interlocutor has considered (and 
rejected) a possible literal interpretation. Another implication of the standard pragmatic model is 
that the processing of figurative meaning is thought to be optional, rather than obligatory. 
By contrast, recent work, pointing to the pervasiveness of figurative language in everyday 
language, has argued that figurative language is in fact central, rather than peripheral, to 
language functioning. Some researchers have even suggested that figurative processing is not 
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restricted to language use but may characterize thought itself (Gibbs, 1994; Giora, 2003; Katz, 
Cacciari, Gibbs & Turner, 1998; Kovecses, 2002; Lakoff & Turner, 1980). 
Models of Figurative Language Processing 
Research on figurative language processing carried out in the last two decades has given 
rise to several different models of figurative language processing aside from the standard 
pragmatic model (e.g., Giora, 2001). Two have attracted particular attention: the conceptual 
metaphor view (Gibbs, 1992, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; and Lakoff & Turner, 1989) and 
the attributive categorization view (Glucksberg, 1991; Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg & Keysar, 
1990; Glucksberg, Brown & McGlone, 1993; Glucksberg, Keysar & McGlone, 1992). 
The conceptual metaphor view claims that linguistic meaning is based on embodied 
experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989). In this view, embodied 
experience (e.g., seeing our body as a container) shapes language and thought and, through 
conceptual metaphors, meanings of words and phrases are constrained, which allows for the 
immediate understanding of linguistic expressions (Gibbs, 2003). Thus, embodied experience is 
the groundwork on which the conceptual metaphor view is built. Gibbs (2003) reviews some of 
the cognitive linguistic work on embodiment that illustrates how metaphor characterizes how we 
think. Via the embodied experience of containment and the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS 
HEATED FLUID UNDER PRESSURE, for example, it is possible to understand figurative 
expressions such as blowing his stack, exploding, flipped her lid, or making someone’s blood boil 
as characterizations of anger. One drawback of this model is that there is no direct empirical 
evidence that knowledge structures in the form of conceptual metaphors are, in fact, accessed 
prior to arriving at a figurative interpretation (but see Gibbs, 2003). The staunchest form of 
evidence for this model may come from studies such as those on figurative language production 
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that show that figurative expressions are produced as clusters and that these clusters are guided 
by conceptual metaphors (Corts & Meyers, 2002). 
The attributive categorization view, put forth by Glucksberg (2003), argues that 
metaphors are understood as categorical assertions. In this view, the sentence Some lawyers are 
sharks is understood as metaphorical when the person encountering this expression has 
knowledge of the meanings associated with the word “shark.” Glucksberg argues that most 
words in metaphors have a dual reference. For example, in Some lawyers are sharks, the 
attributes of “shark” are not limited to cartilaginous fish, but extend to predatory creatures as 
well, allowing the interlocutor to understand the phrase as “some lawyers are predatory.” The 
embodiment view, by contrast, might explain our understanding of this metaphor by claiming 
that the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS (e.g., a snake in the grass, sheep in 
wolf’s clothing, dirty rat) underlies the correspondence between lawyers and sharks. 
The two models presented above differ in the type of knowledge structures they assume 
guide metaphor processing. Whereas the conceptual view holds that conceptual metaphors guide 
metaphor interpretation, the attributive category view holds that categories accessed while 
encountering a metaphor activate other categories that are relevant to the topic (cf. McGlone, 
1996). However, both views theorize that metaphor processing may occur without invoking an 
initial literal interpretation of the metaphor. That is, both models would reject the view that 
specific literal interpretation is first sought and has to be judged anomalous before a figurative 
interpretation is achieved. 
Processing Priority of Literal vs. Non-Literal Meaning: Methodological Issues 
A major debate in psycholinguistic research on figurative language has concerned how to 
test whether metaphorical meanings are understood as quickly and as automatically as literal 
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language (see Gibbs, 1994). Arriving at a consensus about how best to operationalize figurative 
language comprehension has proven to be difficult. Whereas early experimental approaches to 
the study of metaphor employed memory-based techniques, there has been a shift to online 
measures intended to track mental processing while the processing occurs. Latency-based 
(reaction time) measures have been the most commonly used; these include reading times of 
complete phrases or for each word in a figurative phrase, eye movement studies, and priming 
tasks. 
To measure truly online comprehension processing of figurative expressions, some 
researchers have suggested that it is necessary to use spoken rather than written language. One 
popular paradigm used to investigate spoken metaphor comprehension is the cross modal 
priming paradigm (see Blasko & Connine, 1993; Matlock, & Heredia, 2002; and Stewart & 
Heredia, 2002). In this paradigm, participants listen to spoken sentences with an embedded 
metaphor (e.g., “Some lawyers are sharks”) and a visual prime that is related to the literal 
interpretation of the metaphor (e.g., “fish”) or of the metaphorical meaning (e.g., “predators”). 
Visual primes are presented immediately at prime offset, or 300 ms or 1000 ms after prime 
offset, depending on the experimental condition. However, encapsulating the meaning of a 
conceptually rich phrase into a single word is somewhat problematic. 
In a recent review, Glucksberg (2003) refers to an earlier study of his (Glucksberg, 
Gildea, & Bookin, 1982) which sought to answer the question of whether people process 
metaphoric meanings obligatorily or optionally by using a Stroop-like interference paradigm. In 
this seminal study, Glucksberg and colleagues devised a task in which metaphoric meanings, if 
activated, would interfere with task performance. The task was to judge whether a class-
inclusion statement of the form Some As are Bs was literally true or false. Thus, on seeing the 
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statement Some animals are dogs participants were to say “true” and on seeing the statement 
Some weapons are pelicans they were to say “false.” The critical items were metaphorical 
statements such as Some cats are detectives. Glucksberg and colleagues (1982) argued that, on 
reaching a certain level of fluency, users of a language obligatorily activate metaphoric meaning 
if it is available. They thus hypothesized that when participants were required to make a “false” 
response based on a statement’s literal meaning, reaction times would be longer if that statement 
had a metaphorical meaning than if it did not have a metaphorical meaning. That is, “true” 
metaphorical meanings should interfere with making a correct “false” response. Glucksberg et 
al., (1982) found that participants were indeed faster at responding to false statements that were 
not readily perceived as metaphorical (e.g., Some weapons are pelicans) than to statements that 
were more easily perceived as metaphorical (e.g., Some cats are detectives). This finding 
presents a problem for the optional activation of figurative meanings view and suggests instead 
that metaphorical meanings are automatically activated. 
In summary, the consensus based on several studies of idiom and metaphor 
comprehension is that literal meanings do not have priority over figurative meanings and that 
figurative meanings are activated automatically (Gibbs, 1994; Giora, 2003; Glucksberg, 2001; 
Katz et al., 1998; Kovecses, 2002). It should be noted that this consensus is based predominantly 
on research with single language users. What might one expect with respect to figurative 
language processing in multiple language users?  That is, how might knowledge of more than 
one language influence the ease with which figurative meanings are activated in each language, 
relative to the situation in users of a single language?  Secondly, does automatic activation of 
non-literal meanings (such as has been obtained in single language users) depend on attaining a 
certain level of proficiency in a language? In bilinguals who are less proficient in one of their 
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languages might figurative meanings not be automatically activated in the less dominant 
language? These questions were tested in the present research using monolinguals and adult 
fluent and less fluent bilinguals. Since the language proficiency variable introduces a 
developmental component into the discussion, it may be instructive at this juncture to review  
studies of the development of figurative language competence in single language users.  
Developmental Perspectives on Figurative Language Competence 
Figurative language competence is thought to require both linguistic and cognitive 
abilities. Examples of the latter are domain-specific knowledge and cognitive capacity (Gentner, 
1988; Johnson, 1989; 1991; 1996; Johnson & Rosano, 1993). Developmental studies have found 
that children can understand figurative expressions once they have attained a certain level of 
mastery over requisite linguistic and conceptual skills (Gentner, 1988; Johnson, 1989; 1991; 
1996; Johnson & Rosano, 1993). Johnson (1991) identified conceptual knowledge, linguistic 
ability and information processing capacities as developmentally influenced factors required for 
the understanding of figurative language.  
Levorato (1993) suggested the following developmental sequence underlying figurative 
competence: a) a broadening of word meanings, b) knowledge of multiple meanings of words, c) 
cancellation of referential strategies (i.e., converting metaphors into similes), d) an understanding 
of the relationship between figurative and literal uses of words, e) use of context to understand 
ambiguous and novel words, and f) an ability to produce novel expressions and syntactically 
transform figurative expressions. 
As noted with the adult literature on processing of figurative language, developmental 
studies have had to contend with methodological concerns as well. One is the use of tasks such 
as multiple-choice tests or paraphrasing. Studies that employ offline tasks such as multiple-
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choice tests may not be sensitive enough to measure comprehension at the level of interest here. 
That is, offline tasks cannot allow one to infer anything about processes during comprehension; 
instead, they are more likely to inform one about processes that may come into play after 
comprehension has occurred. This limitation aside, the developmental approach has offered 
valuable insights into the kinds of skills that underlie the emergence of figurative language 
competence. 
Figurative Language Processing in Second Language Users and Bilinguals 
Figurative language competence has piqued the interest of a number of second language 
researchers. Leading the front are Danesi (1992, 1995) and Johnson and Rosano (1993). They 
argue that metaphors and idioms cannot afford to be ignored by second language curricula. Their 
push is to instill in language learners a more functional communicative competence over a 
traditional formal competence. Danesi (1995) argues, for example, that second language learners 
do not reach the fluency level of a native speaker until they have knowledge of “how that 
language ‘reflects’ or encodes concepts on the basis of metaphorical reasoning” (p. 5). Other 
second language researchers interested in conceptual fluency have investigated formulaic 
expressions (Kecskes, 2000; Wray, 2003), phrasal verbs (Matlock & Heredia, 2002) and idioms 
(Bortfeld, 2002; Cooper, 1999).  
Second language research on figurative language processing is important and relevant to 
the present study. However, the present study differs from these other studies in that it seeks to 
investigate conceptual representation structures of bilinguals (i.e., those who have attained a 
stable level of language competence in their two languages) rather than second language 
learners. 
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There is some previous empirical research on metaphors in the context of bilingualism. 
Most of this work has been addressed at how the memory for metaphors may be influenced by 
such factors as structure or orienting task. Harris and colleagues, for example, compared 
bilinguals’ memory for similes and metaphors in each language and found that bilinguals 
remember the metaphor phrases as similes (Harris, Tebbe, Leka, Garcia, & Erramouspe, 1999). 
Nelson (1992, 1995) examined memory for metaphors vs. non-metaphors in a levels of 
processing approach to memory. In these studies, the researcher was interested in investigating 
how the different orienting conditions influenced the recall of metaphorical statements. Under 
the various orienting conditions non-fluent bilinguals translated into English (L1) either the 
figurative meaning, literal meaning, or a non-specific instructed translation or merely copied 
metaphoric statements presented in Spanish (L2). Nelson found that bilinguals’ recall was best 
when they had to translate the metaphor’s figurative meaning. Similarly, Vaid and Martinez 
(2001) examined bilinguals’ incidental memory for the language of proverbs, for Spanish and 
English proverbs that underwent different levels of processing in the encoding phase. They 
found, among other results, that meaning-based prior encoding (i.e., paraphrasing the proverb) 
lessened the accuracy of recognition of the input language of the proverbs relative to simply 
copying the proverb.  
Other work in bilingualism has considered metaphor interpretation in bilingual children 
as a function of degree of language competence (e.g., Bountrogianni, 1988; Johnson, 1996; and 
Johnson & Rosano, 1993). However, a limitation of some of these studies is that they do not 
directly address the issue of conceptual representations. Instead, they address semantic issues 
that may be at play during figurative language comprehension. That is, the approach taken by 
Johnson and colleagues suggests that the metaphoric statement, My shirt is a butterfly, can be 
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interpreted as metaphorically based primarily on the knowledge of the meaning of the words 
“shirt” and “butterfly” and less on the underlying conceptual relationship between shirt and 
butterfly in L1 and/or L2. 
More generally, existing theoretical frameworks of bilingual lexical memory have been 
criticized for focusing only on lexical or semantic variables with little consideration of the 
complexities of conceptual representations in bilinguals and how they might change and interact 
with changes in language proficiency or use (Pavlenko, 2000). Indeed, while there is active 
examination within monolingual research of the nature of conceptual structures in metaphorical 
processing, the same cannot be said of research in bilingualism. With few exceptions, the 
predominant emphasis of psycholinguistic investigations of bilingual language processing to date 
has been on testing models of lexical processing or production. Some recent work has addressed 
sentence comprehension (Heredia & Altarriba, 2002) but experimental studies of figurative 
language use in bilinguals remain relatively scarce. 
In part to redress this gap, Vaid (2000) suggested that the study of creative language use, 
such as humor, provides a promising avenue for investigations of conceptual representations in 
bilingual memory. The study of metaphoric processing clearly constitutes an example of creative 
use of language and should, likewise, contribute to advancing our understanding of the relation 
between linguistic and conceptual functioning in users of more than one language.  
Impact of Bilingualism on Language and Cognitive Development 
There has been a longstanding tradition within cognitive research on bilingualism to 
examine linguistic and conceptual repercussions of mastering two symbolic systems (Lambert, 
1969; Bialystok, 2004, in press). Vygotsky (1962) speculated about the enhanced linguistic 
awareness that may ensue from knowing two languages: “the child learns to see his language as 
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one particular system among many, to view its phenomena under more general categories, and 
this leads to awareness of his linguistic operations”(p. 110). This insight was put to empirical test 
in Peal and Lambert’s (1962) landmark study which established, for the first time, a positive 
advantage of bilingualism on linguistic and nonverbal functioning. As Bialystok (2004) notes, 
Peal and Lambert “concluded that the experience of having two ways to describe the world gave 
the bilingual the basis for understanding that many things could be seen in two ways, leading to a 
more flexible approach to perception and to interpretation”(p. 579). 
Since the Peal and Lambert study, several other studies have also shown specific 
cognitive repercussions associated with knowing two or more languages beyond a certain 
minimum level of competence. These include enhanced metalinguistic awareness (understanding 
that words and meanings are arbitrarily linked), word segmentation ability, ambiguity detection, 
syntactic awareness, and phonological awareness. Not all tasks in which bilingual and 
monolingual children have been compared produce a bilingual advantage, though. Bialystok 
(2004) considers the cognitive advantage arising from bilingualism to be a form of enhanced 
selective attention, noting that “the cognitive effect of bilingualism is to enhance the ability to 
selectively attend to specific features and to ignore or inhibit attention to salient but misleading 
information” (p. 597). 
Among the findings ascribed to bilingualism in the cognitive literature is an enhanced 
awareness of multiple meanings of ambiguous words or sentences. Surprisingly, however, no 
previous study has directly sought to compare bilingual vs. monolingual processing of literal vs. 
non-literal meanings of words or phrases. At the very least, in the present study, which examined 
whether non-literal meanings are automatically activated even when the task requires judgments 
only of literal meanings of statements, one would expect bilinguals to show at least as strong an 
12 
interference effect as monolinguals from the metaphoric meanings of literally false statements 
and probably even greater interference than monolinguals. 
Present Research 
The present research examined first whether non-optional activation of metaphoric 
meaning found in monolinguals will also be found to the same extent in the two languages of 
bilingual adults. A second goal of the present study was to determine to what extent figurative 
meaning activation may be influenced by language proficiency. It was predicted that, if a certain 
threshold level of linguistic fluency is a necessary condition for the metaphor interference effect 
to occur, that we would only expect to see interference when participants are tested in their more 
dominant language. If, on the other hand, metaphoric meaning activation relies on a conceptual 
system that is language-independent, a metaphor interference effect would be expected in the 
dominant and the non-dominant language, regardless of language proficiency. 
In monolingual research, stimulus familiarity has been shown to influence the degree to 
which an utterance is processed literally or figuratively. The present research will provide an 
indirect test of this issue in that it will allow us to examine if stimulus (or, in this case, language) 
familiarity is a factor determining when and if literal meaning is given processing priority. 
Bilinguals who are more dominant in English than in Spanish would presumably take longer to 
process the Spanish items in general. Would greater difficulty in processing the less familiar 
language mean that items presented in that language are first (and perhaps only) processed 
literally)? 
The methodology used in the present research involved an adaptation of the Glucksberg 
et al. (1982) metaphor interference paradigm. This paradigm offers a useful alternative to 
standard lexical decision reaction time paradigms that have attempted to investigate the 
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comprehension processes of figurative expressions. Glucksberg et al. (1982) suggest that the 
interference paradigm is well suited for investigations of meaning activation in figurative 
language because category-assertion decisions are likely to be post-lexical. That is, in the 
metaphor interference paradigm participants have to decide whether a phrase is literally true or 
false and not simply whether the statement is grammatical or whether it “makes sense.” Given 
the proper motivation, participants may be able to “make sense” and correctly classify as 
grammatical even such notoriously ungrammatical sentences as Chomsky’s “Colorless green 
ideas sleep furiously.” The metaphor interference paradigm prevents that type of strategizing. 
Furthermore, Hoffman and Kemper (1987) in reviewing reaction time studies of metaphor 
comprehension concluded that the metaphor interference paradigm is “the most ‘finely tuned’ 
figurative language comprehension task” (p. 168). 
Overview of Experiments  
In what follows, four experiments are described. Experiment 1 was designed to establish 
that a metaphor interference effect is replicable in a group of English-speaking monolinguals; 
this experiment used the same materials and procedure as were used by Glucksberg et al. (1982, 
Exp. 3). Experiment 2 was designed to investigate if a metaphor interference effect for English 
sentences is also present in English-Spanish bilinguals, and to compare the size of the 
interference obtained in bilinguals vs. monolinguals. Experiment 2 compared two groups of 
bilinguals: those who were more dominant in English than Spanish, and those equally proficient 
in both, on the basis of self-report data. Experiment 3 sought to test if a metaphor interference 
effect is present in both languages of bilinguals; in this experiment, bilinguals varying in Spanish 
proficiency were tested using English and Spanish stimuli. Lastly, Experiment 4 was designed to 
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test how procedural variables (i.e., list length) introduced in Experiment 3 influences the 
metaphor interference effect. 
15 
EXPERIMENT 1 
This experiment was designed simply to replicate the Glucksberg et al. metaphor 
interference effect using the same stimuli and procedure as was described in Glucksberg et al. 
(1982, Exp. 3) with a set of monolingual participants in Texas. 
Method 
Participants 
As a pretest measure, 30 undergraduate students at Texas A&M University provided 
metaphorical and familiarity ratings to the sentences from Experiment 3 in Glucksberg et al. 
(1982) for research credit. An additional group of 33 English monolingual students participated 
in the metaphor interference experiment for research credit. 
Materials 
The same 24 Metaphor sentences and 24 Scrambled Metaphor sentences of the form 
‘Some X’s are Y’s’ from Glucksberg et al. (1982, Experiment 3) were used (see Appendix). The 
30 pretest participants rated the sentences on a 7-point scale for metaphoricity (i.e., metaphor 
goodness) and familiarity (where 1 refers to low and 7 to high). The mean metaphorical and 
familiarity ratings for the Metaphor sentences were 4.96 and 3.93 respectively, while the mean 
metaphorical and familiarity ratings for the Scrambled Metaphor sentences were 2.01 and 1.23 
respectively. These numbers are comparable to the metaphorical and familiarity ratings from the 
Glucksberg et al. (1982) study where the mean metaphor and familiarity ratings were 5.33 and 
4.84, respectively for the Metaphor sentences. 
Two practice lists were constructed. Practice list 1 was composed of 12 items and 
contained 6 instances of the word “true” and 6 instances of the word “false”. This practice list 
ensured that the participants are familiar with the key assignments to indicate their responses to 
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the sentences. Practice list 2 consisted of 48 stimuli of the form Some Xs are Ys. Of these 48 
items, 12 items included exemplars that are highly typical members of their given category (e.g., 
Some fruits are apples; Some insects are ants), 12 items were low typical members of their given 
category (e.g., Some fruits are figs; Some insects are crickets), and 12 items were false instances 
of the category items such that items presented in the true condition were re-paired to form false 
statements (e.g., Some fruits are crickets, Some insects are apples). Six items were metaphorical 
statements (e.g., Some words are daggers, Some girls are radios). These metaphorical statements 
were the same ones employed by Glucksberg et al., (1982, Experiments 1 and 2). Finally, six 
items were scrambled metaphors formed by re-pairing the metaphorical statements (e.g., Some 
girls are daggers, Some words are radios). 
The test list consisted of 192 items. Forty-eight of these items were statements that are 
high typical instances of their given category (e.g., Some flowers are daisies), 48 were statements 
that are low typical instances of their given category (e.g., Some flowers are gladiolas). 
Similarly, 48 items were re-paired to form the Standard False statements (e.g., Some flowers are 
cobras). The items were displayed on the computer screen under the control of a computer 
program (E-Prime, 2000). 
Design and Procedure 
A repeated measures design was used with four levels of sentence type as the within 
subjects factor. The participants were informed that the task of this study was to decide whether 
a phrase is true or false. They were instructed to make their decisions by using their right index 
finger to press the “O” key when the sentence was true and their right middle finger to press the 
“P” key when the sentence was false. Additionally, they were instructed to advance from one 
item to the next by using their left index finger to press the “Q” key to clear a fixation point 
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(+++). At this point, the fixation point was replaced with a blank slide for 50 ms prior to 
displaying the next item. Finally, they were instructed to respond as quickly as possible but to be 
accurate as well. 
The first practice session ensued once the participant had heard the instructions for the 
study. In the practice session they were told that either the word “true” or “false” would appear 
on the screen and that they were to respond by using the assigned keys. The experimenter gave 
feedback to the participants when incorrect or hesitant responses were given. A second practice 
session ensued once the participant indicated familiarity with the key assignments. 
In the second practice session, the participants encountered sample sentences (Appendix 
B) and were instructed to indicate whether a sentence is true or false using the assigned keys. 
The experimenter gave feedback when incorrect or hesitant responses were given. At the end of 
this practice session, the experimenter clarified any questions and reminded the participants of 
their task one last time. At this point, the 192 test sentences were presented. At the end of the 
testing session, the participants filled out a language background questionnaire to ensure that 
only data from English monolinguals were included in this experiment. 
Results 
Mean RTs for correct responses only were included in the data analysis. Responses that 
were less than 150 milliseconds or greater than 4000 milliseconds were treated as errors. Table 1 
summarizes the reaction time scores by stimulus type, i.e., “true” statements (further subdivided 
by high vs. low typicality), and three types of “false” statements - standard, metaphors, and 
scrambled metaphors. 
A paired samples t test was computed to compare responses to “true” statements 
according to whether they were high or low in typicality. This comparison serves as a 
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manipulation check to ensure that subjects in the task are processing sentences as they normally 
do in sentence verification tasks (i.e., faster responding to high typical than low typical). This 
was indeed the case with the monolingual subjects (t(32) = -9.128, p < .01). The high vs. low 
typicality data were pooled in subsequent analyses. 
The mean RT for the four sentence types differed reliably (F (2.13, 68.16) = 9.31, p < 
.01). The degrees of freedom were adjusted using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction following the 
convention for controlling for the violation of the sphericity assumption underlying this analysis. 
Planned comparisons were conducted to test the hypotheses that the average response time for 
True sentences will differ from that for False sentences, and that the average response times of 
the Metaphor sentences will differ from the average of those other sentences requiring a false 
response. True sentences were responded to faster than were any other sentence type (t (160) = - 
2.99) and responses to metaphoric statements were slower than to any other type of sentence that 
required a false response (t (160) = 3.23). Pairwise comparisons showed that the mean difference 
between Metaphor sentences and Standard false sentences was significant (MD = 85.68, p < .01). 
However, the mean difference between the Scrambled and the Metaphor sentences was 
marginally significant (MD = 41.16, p= .069). Evaluating the strength of the relationship 
between these two sentence types (omega square = .62) suggests that increasing the sample size 
might reveal a significant difference at the accepted significance level of .05. 
Discussion 
The data suggest that the results from Glucksberg et al. (1982) were replicated. If one 
attributes fast reaction times to an easy literal true-false decision and slower reaction times to a 
more difficult decision, it can be suggested that the monolingual participants in this study 
activated the nonliteral meanings of the metaphor sentences non-optionally. This supports the 
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view that accessing the nonliteral meanings of sentences need not follow an a priori activation 
and rejection of its literal meaning. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
To explore figurative language processing further, the metaphor interference effect was 
examined in two groups of English-Spanish bilinguals tested in English. One group was more 
dominant in English than Spanish while the other group considered themselves equally proficient 
in English and Spanish. Two questions were of interest here: would a metaphor interference 
effect be obtained for English to the same extent in bilinguals who are more fluent in English 
than Spanish as in those who are equally fluent in English and Spanish? Secondly, would the size 
of the metaphor interference effect obtained in bilinguals be the same as or larger than that 
obtained in monolinguals? 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-seven English-Spanish undergraduate students from Texas A&M International 
University in Laredo, Texas, participated in this study for research credit. Two participants were 
excluded because their comprehension in Spanish was better than English and two other subjects 
were excluded because of coding error. 
Responses from a self-report Language Background Questionnaire (see Appendix B) 
were used to assess participants’ proficiency level. A composite comprehension score was 
computed by taking the average of participants’ 7-point understanding, reading and speaking 
scores for each language. These scores were submitted to a paired samples t-test. The average for 
the English composite proficiency score was 6.51 (SD = 1.12) while the average Spanish 
composite proficiency score was 5.40 (SD = 1.44). This difference was statistically significant 
(t(36) = 3.34, p < .01). A 95% confidence interval was constructed for these data. The upper and 
lower limits were 1.78 and .44 respectively. Participants were classified as “Equally proficient” 
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if the difference between their English and Spanish composite comprehension scores lay inside 
the confidence interval. Similarly, if the difference between their English and Spanish composite 
scores lay outside the confidence interval, they were classified as more English or Spanish 
dominant (see Table 2). 
Following the above criteria, 14 of the bilinguals were classified as English dominant and 
19 were classified as equally proficient in both languages. Participants from the two groups did 
not differ in their relative dominance in English. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedures of this experiment were identical to those of Experiment 1, 
with the exception that PsyScope was the computer software used to display the sentences and 
collect the participant’s responses. Additionally, the participants answered a Language 
Background Questionnaire (see Appendix) that included self-ratings of understanding, reading, 
and speaking of both English and Spanish on a 7-point scale. Responses were used to assess 
whether participants were English dominant or equally proficient in their two languages. 
Experiment 2 was a mixed design with the four levels of sentence type as the within 
subjects factor and bilingual group (English Dominant vs. Equally Proficient) as the between 
subjects factor. 
Results 
To ensure that participants were responding in accordance with the norm of sentence 
verification tasks, the averages of the high typical true sentences and the low typical true 
sentences for the English dominant group and the equally proficient group were examined in 
separate t- tests. A paired samples t test was computed to compare the high typical (M = 1432.53, 
SD = 230.32) and low typical (M = 1699.72, SD = 264.45) true sentences for the English 
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dominant group. This difference was significant (t(13) = -10.79, p < .01), indicating that the 
participants in this group were responding as would be expected in a sentence verification task. 
Therefore, the high/low typicality true data were pooled in subsequent analyses. In the same 
manner, a paired samples t test was computed to compare the high typical (M = 1407.08, SD = 
284.51) and low typical (M = 1619.75, SD = 310.71) true sentences for the equally proficient 
group. This analysis also revealed a significant difference between the two sentence types, (t(18) 
= -10.66, p < .01). These data were also pooled in subsequent analyses. 
The data (see Table 3) were submitted to a mixed design ANOVA with Bilingual Group 
(English Dominant vs. Equally Proficient) as the between subjects factor and Sentence Type as 
the within subjects factor. There was a main effect of Sentence Type (F (3, 93) = 29.78, p < .01) 
but no main effect of Group (F(1,31) = 1.154, p = .291). Group by Sentence Type was 
marginally significant (F (3,93) = 2.58, p = .058). The simple main effects of bilingual group at 
each level of sentence type showed that the interaction was a result of differences in the 
sentences that required a false response. That is, the English Dominant Group was significantly 
slower at responding to the Metaphor Sentences (F(1, 124) = 33.97, p < .01), the Scrambled 
Metaphor Sentences (F(1, 124) = 33.78, p < .01), and the Standard False Sentences (F(1, 124) = 
10.41, ) but not the True Sentences (F(1,124) = 3.01, p < .08). 
Planned comparisons were computed separately per bilingual group to test the hypothesis 
that average response time for True sentences will be faster than that for False sentences, and 
that average response times for the Metaphor sentences will be slower than the average of the 
Scrambled Metaphor and Standard False sentence types. 
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English Dominant Group 
The mean responses to the True sentences were indeed faster than those to the False 
sentences (t(93) = -5.10, p < .01). Furthermore, the mean responses to the Metaphor sentences 
were reliably slower than those to any other type of sentence that required a “false” response 
(t(93) = 4.48). The pairwise comparison between Metaphor and Standard False sentences was 
significant (MD = 38.70, p < .01). However, while the difference between the Metaphor and the 
Sentences and the Scrambled Metaphor conditions was in the expected direction, it failed to 
reach statistical significance (MD = 74.28, p = .12). 
Equally Proficient Group 
The responses to the True sentences were faster than to any of the False sentence types 
(t(93) = -2.89, p < .01). Moreover, responses to the Metaphor sentences were reliably slower 
than to other sentence types requiring a “false” response (t (93) = 6.45). Once again, the pairwise 
comparison between Metaphor and Standard False sentences was significant (MD = 165.30, p < 
.01), but the difference between the Metaphor Sentences and the Scrambled Metaphor was not 
(MD = 73.77, p = .12). 
Bilinguals vs. Monolinguals 
To compare the size of the metaphor interference effect across monolinguals (from 
Experiment 1) and bilinguals in the present experiment, metaphor interference indices were 
computed by taking the difference between the mean response to Metaphor sentences and the 
response to the average of the Scrambled and Standard false sentences (both of which also 
required a ”false” response). The size of the index provides an indication of the relative difficulty 
in rejecting a Metaphor Sentence as false. The Metaphor Interference Index for the monolingual 
participants in Experiment 1 was 63.42 milliseconds while the corresponding values were 159.31 
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and 121.54 for the English Dominant and Equally Proficient Bilinguals, respectively. Thus, 
bilinguals showed nearly double the amount of interference from metaphoric meaning than 
monolinguals. See Figure 1 for a summary of the False Sentences by Experiment (e.g., 
Glucksberg et al, 1982 study, and Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study). 
Discussion 
The results from Experiment 2 clearly show that the metaphor interference effect is 
robust in participants tested in a language that is their more proficient one, or in a language in 
which they are equally proficient as their other language. From these results, one can conclude 
that non-optional activation of the figurative meanings of metaphor sentences is not limited to 
monolinguals. Indeed, the effect appears to be even greater in bilinguals than monolinguals. 
However, given that bilinguals in this experiment were tested only in their more dominant (or 
highly proficient) language, the question remains as to whether the size of the effect may vary 
according to degree of language proficiency. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
This experiment was conducted to investigate whether metaphor interference will occur 
in the less dominant language to the same degree as the more dominant language of English 
dominant bilinguals and whether it will be equivalent across the two languages of equally 
proficient bilinguals. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 26 English-Spanish undergraduate students at Texas A&M University 
participated in this study for research credit. Participants completed a Language Background 
Questionnaire (see Appendix) that included their self-ratings for understanding, reading, and 
speaking of each language on a 7-point scale. A composite comprehension score was computed 
by taking the average of participants’ 7-point understanding, reading and speaking scores for 
each language. These scores were submitted to a paired samples t-test. The average for the 
English composite proficiency score was 6.9 (SD = .26) while the average Spanish composite 
proficiency score was 6.56 (SD = .29). This difference was statistically significant (t(26) = 5.11, 
p < .01). A 95% confidence interval was constructed for these data. The upper and lower limits 
were 0.48 and 0.21 respectively. Participants were classified as “Equally proficient” if the 
difference between their English and Spanish composite comprehension scores lay inside the 
confidence interval. Similarly, if the difference between their English and Spanish composite 
scores lay outside the confidence interval, they were classified as more English or Spanish 
dominant (see Table 2). 
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A separate group of eleven English-Spanish undergraduate students at Texas A&M 
University provided metaphorical and familiarity ratings for the Spanish translations of the 24 
English metaphor sentences. 
Materials 
The Spanish version of the 24 Metaphors is presented in the Appendix. The pretest 
participants first rated the Spanish version of the sentences on a 7-point scale for metaphorical 
(i.e., metaphor-goodness) and familiarity (where 1 refers to “low” and 7 to “high”). The mean 
metaphorical and familiarity ratings for the Spanish metaphor sentences were 4.93 and 3.21 
respectively. These numbers are comparable to the metaphorical and familiarity ratings obtained 
for English in Experiment 1 (i.e., 4.96 and 3.93, respectively). 
The stimuli were initially translated from English to Spanish by the experimenter. 
However, the participants who provided the metaphorical and familiarity ratings were also asked 
to back translate the sentences from English to Spanish. This ensured that the most common 
wording for across languages was maintained. Additionally, the experimenter translated the 
practice items from English to Spanish. 
Procedure 
The procedure in this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 2, with the 
exception that E-prime was the computer software used to display the sentences and collect the 
participants’ responses. Furthermore, half of the items presented to each participant were 
presented in English and half were presented in Spanish. The language of presentation was 
blocked so that the first half of the 192 test items were presented in English first and the 
remainder were presented in Spanish first. Four lists were constructed to counterbalance the 
language presentation order and control for any order effects. 
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Fourteen participants (8 English Dominant and 6 Equally proficient) were tested in 
English followed by Spanish, while 12 participants (4 English Dominant and 8 Equally 
proficient) were tested in Spanish followed by English. 
Design 
Experiment 3 was a 2x4x2 mixed design with Sentence Type and Language of 
Presentation as within-subjects factors and Bilingual Group as the between subjects factor. 
Results 
A preliminary analysis comparing the performance of bilinguals who were given English 
items first vs. Spanish items first showed no order effects (F < 1). 
A summary of the correct reaction time responses as a function of Language Presentation, 
Group and Sentence Type is presented in Table 4. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
computed to test whether the difference in mean response times between the high and low 
typicality “true” sentences was significantly different. The analysis suggested that this was 
indeed the case (F(1.687, 40.484) = 41.59, p < .01) a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was 
applied to the degrees of freedom to control for violating the homogeneity of sphericity 
assumption and the high-low “true” responses were pooled in subsequent analyses.  
The main effect for Sentence Type was significant (F(2.10, 50.42) = 11.94, p < .01); the 
degrees of freedom were adjusted to control for the violation of sphericity using the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. Language of Presentation was also significant (F(1,24) = 65.73, p < .01), 
indicating slower responses overall to Spanish than to English sentences. 
The two-way interaction of Presentation Language by Sentence Type was significant 
(F(3, 72) = 4.74, p < .01). Neither of the other two-way interactions, Sentence Type and 
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Bilingual Group, and Language Presentation and Bilingual Group, were significant (Fs < 1) nor 
was the three-way interaction (F (3, 72) = < 1, ns). 
To determine the nature of the two-way interaction of Presentation Language and 
Sentence Type, the simple main effects of Sentence Type at each level of Presentation Language 
were examined. Sentence Type was significant for English (F(3, 144) = 29.74, p <.01) and for 
Spanish (F(3,144) = 218.38). This suggests that the nature of the interaction may be attributed to 
differences in responding to English and Spanish phrases. Thus, it seems as if the participants 
were slower across all sentence types when the items were in Spanish. 
Once again, planned comparison analyses were conducted to determine whether the 
participants were faster at responding to “true” sentences over any other type of sentence and 
whether metaphor sentences were reliably slower than any other type of sentence that required a 
“false” response. 
English Dominant Group 
The responses to the True sentences were reliably faster than to any other type of 
sentence when the items were presented in English (t(72) = -.3.12, p < .01). However, the 
responses to the Metaphor sentences in English were not reliably slower than to any other type of 
sentences that required a “false” response (t(72) = .843, p = .40). 
Similarly, when the items were presented in Spanish, the True sentences were reliably 
faster than any other type of sentences (t(72) = -4.80, p < .01). However, responses to the 
Metaphor sentences were not reliably slower than to any other type of sentences that required a 
“false” response (t(72) = .614, p =.54). 
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Equally Proficient Group 
For the Equally Proficient bilingual group in English, responses to the True sentences 
were not reliably faster than to any of the false sentences (t(72) = -.475, p < .64). Furthermore, 
responses to the Metaphor sentences were not reliably slower than to any other type of sentences 
that required a “false” response (t(72) = 1.614, p = .11). 
However, when the items were presented in Spanish, the Equally Proficient bilinguals 
were significantly faster to decide whether a sentence is true over any other type of sentence 
(t(72) = -7.54, p < .01). This group was also reliably slower at rejecting a Metaphor sentence as 
false than any other sentence that required a “false” response (t (72) = 2.65, p < .01). 
Discussion 
The results showed that responses to the Spanish stimuli were, in general, slower than 
those to English stimuli. Moreover, while the English Dominant group showed faster “true” than 
“false” responses for English and Spanish items, the Equally Proficient group showed faster 
“true” relative to “false” responses only for Spanish items. Finally, the metaphor interference 
effect in the present experiment was reliable only for the Equally Proficient bilinguals, and only 
for Spanish items. 
Based on the results from Experiment 3, one cannot conclude that there is non-optional 
activation of figurative meanings for the metaphor sentences, as we did in Experiments 1 and 2. 
One interpretation of the different pattern of findings in this experiment relative to the previous 
two experiments lies in the fact that, because half of the items were presented in English and half 
in Spanish, the total number of critical items (metaphor sentences) was half that of the previous 
experiments, where only one language was tested. Since only correct responses were included in 
the data analyses, it is possible that while the participants may be committing the same number 
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of errors as in the two previous experiments, the effect of removing the error trials in the present 
experiment was to eliminate an interference effect. The error rate for the English stimuli was .10 
while the error rate for the Spanish stimuli was .29. This difference was statistically significant 
(t(1) = 5.56, p < .01). 
The fact remains that one of the bilingual groups in this experiment, namely, the Equally 
Proficient group, did show a reliable metaphor interference effect, in Spanish, even with the 
reduced stimulus set. Although this group was designated as Equally Proficient, this group may 
have been more proficient in Spanish than the English Dominant group, who, interestingly, did 
not show a metaphor interference effect in Spanish. However, the Spanish Composite 
Comprehension Scores between the English Dominant group (M = 6.47, SD = .33) and the 
Equally Proficient group (M = 6.60, SD = .23) were not significantly different (F(1,24) < 1). 
Therefore, it is possible that the non-optional activation of the figurative meanings of metaphor 
sentences is proficiency-dependent. However, this account does not explain why the English 
dominant bilinguals did not show metaphor interference in their more dominant language. Nor is 
there an explanation for why the Equally Proficient group did not show faster responses to the 
“true” relative to the “false” items in English. 
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EXPERIMENT 4 
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to examine whether procedural variables introduced in 
Experiment 3 were responsible for the lack of a statistically significant finding in the dominant 
language (English) for both English Dominant and Equally proficient groups. To accomplish this 
English Monolinguals were tested using only half of the original materials. This will determine 
whether the truncated list compromised the sensitivity of the metaphor interference paradigm. 
Method 
Participants 
A group of 17 undergraduate students from Texas A&M University participated in this 
experiment. Data were excluded from two participants who indicated English was not their 
native language. 
Materials 
Two lists were constructed from the original 192 items. The list consisted of 24 High 
Typical (true), 24 Low Typical (true), 12 Standard False, 6 Scrambled Metaphor and 6 metaphor 
sentences for a total of 96 items. 
Procedure 
The procedures were the same as Experiment 3 with the exception that only English 
items were used. 
Results 
As with all previous experiments only correct responses were used in the analyses. A 
paired samples t-test indicated that the responses to the High Typical Sentences that required a 
true response were significantly faster than the responses to the Low Typical Sentences that also 
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required a true response (t(14) = -4.22, p < .01). Therefore, the data for the true sentences were 
pooled in subsequent analyses. 
Nine participants received half of the 192 items while 6 participants received the other 
half of the 192 items. The difference across the two lists was not statistically significant (F(1,13) 
= 2.48, p = .14). Furthermore, the interaction between Sentence Type and List Version was not 
significant (F(4,52) = 1.81, p = .14). There fore the data for the List Versions were pooled in 
subsequent analyses. 
The means and standard deviations for each of the sentence types are presented in table 5. 
The effect for Sentence Type was statistically significant (F(3,42) = 4.89, p < .01). Planned 
comparisons were computed to determine whether the responses to True Sentences were faster 
than those of False responses. This analyses indicated that the responses for the True sentences 
are not significantly faster than to any other type of sentences (t(42) = -1.42, p = .16). One the 
other hand, the Metaphor Sentences were significantly slower than to any other sentence that 
required a false response (t(42) = 3.49, p < .01). 
Discussion 
The lack of a statistically significant effect between True Sentences and all other sentence 
types may support the argument that a shorter list attenuates this effect. On the other hand, and 
more importantly, the shorter list does not attenuate the metaphor interference effect. 
Therefore, based on the results of Experiment 4, one may rule out the possibility that a 
shorter list compromises the sensitivity of the paradigm and does not attenuate the metaphor 
interference effect. 
33 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A task such as the metaphor interference task requires participants to decide whether a 
phrase is literally true or false. If the participants in this study take longer to reject as literally 
true metaphorical phrases over the control phrases that also require a false response, regardless 
of proficiency level, it would be concluded that automaticity of metaphorical activation is not 
contingent on language-familiarity-based factors such as proficiency. Instead, one could infer 
that the participants rely predominantly on their underlying conceptual system to understand the 
phrases. If, on the other hand, proficiency level interacts with interference size, one might infer 
that non-optional activation of metaphoric meanings occurs only, or to a larger degree, in the 
bilingual’s more dominant language. 
As reported above, the results from the present set of experiments suggest that language 
proficiency plays at least some role in determining whether the figurative meanings of metaphor 
sentences were accessed. However, while one might be inclined to conclude that this study was 
unsuccessful in trying to assess exactly how language proficiency interacts with obtaining a 
metaphor interference in the dominant and less dominant language, the results from Experiment 
3 do have some light to shed. The metaphor interference was not obtained with English 
Dominant bilinguals; however, it was obtained in the Equally Proficient bilinguals but only in 
Spanish, their less dominant language. 
One might speculate that the proficiency level of Spanish for the English dominant 
bilinguals was lower than the requisite level (if indeed there is one) necessary to automatically 
activate the figurative meanings of Spanish metaphoric sentences. On the other hand, the Equally 
proficient bilinguals were perhaps at the necessary level to automatically activate the figurative 
meanings of Spanish Metaphor Sentences. Nevertheless, the fact that the metaphor interference 
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was not obtained in either of the bilingual groups’ dominant language is perplexing and might be 
indicative of alternative explanations outside of the dependency on proficiency in obtaining the 
metaphor interference. Therefore, some alternative explanations need to be explored. 
Both the English Dominant and Equally Proficient Groups showed the typical finding of 
sentence verification tasks (i.e., responses to high typical true sentences are faster than those of 
low typical sentences). Therefore, it can be concluded that, at least for the True sentences the 
participants are behaving in a typical manner (although it should be noted that this was not the 
case for the Equally Proficient group on English, in Exp. 3). However, there is reason to believe 
that the same cannot be said about their behavior for the False sentences. The difference between 
Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3 was the inclusion of the Language Presentation 
condition. While this condition allows for the comparison of how different bilingual groups 
perform, inclusion of this condition may have compromised the sensitivity of the paradigm. As 
indicated above, the error rate is a concern in this experiment primarily because it minimizes the 
number of items available for the analyses. However, Experiment 4 showed that this may not be 
the case. A second concern may be the cost of switching from one language to another. While 
this was controlled by blocking the Language Presentation levels, some participants indicated a 
difficulty in adjusting to the language switch. This provides a way in which the design of 
Experiment 3 may be adapted to limit the compromising of the sensitivity. Future studies should 
be conducted with “buffer” items to allow the participants to adjust to the language switch. 
Limitations/Caveats 
One initial concern was that some metaphors used in the study may either be language 
specific or differ in their metaphoricity across languages. That is, because the Spanish stimuli 
employed in this study were translated from English to Spanish it is possible that what is seen as 
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metaphorical in English may not always be seen as metaphorical to the same degree in Spanish. 
However, this issue was empirically addressed by judgments of metaphoricity from native 
speakers of each language in Experiment 3 and it can be concluded that the stimuli are 
comparable across languages. 
Another limitation of the research is that it did not specifically explore language-related 
differences in metaphoric conceptualization. In future research it will be of interest to consider 
whether metaphoric processing associated with one language carries over to influence the 
interpretation of novel metaphors. Another potential limitation of the present study is that the 
results may not generalize beyond the particular format of expressions studied here, namely, 
some Xs are Ys. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there is at present very little experimental 
work directed at understanding metaphoric processing in bilinguals, the results of this study are 
of interest and should serve as a springboard for further investigations of other forms of 
figurative expressions and creative language use. 
Theoretical Implications for Models of Bilingual Memory 
The results of this study may have some implications for models of bilingual memory 
representation that postulate a weak link between the second language lexical level and the 
conceptual level, such as the revised hierarchical model (Kroll & Stewart, 1994). That is, if 
participants are indeed able to automatically activate metaphorical meanings, one might conclude 
that such a model is only adequate at the word level and does not extend to the conceptual level. 
In that event, perhaps other models, such as the conceptual feature model (DeGroot, 1992) that 
postulate the sharing of some conceptual features across languages while others remain specific 
to one language, would be better equipped to accommodate such results. 
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These theoretical accounts of bilingual representational structure can be applied to 
explain the significant results in Experiment 3. That is, the revised hierarchical model might 
postulate that the Equally Proficient bilinguals obtained metaphor interference because they were 
at a developmental level where they would have to mentally translate the sentences from their 
less dominant language into their more dominant language to access the concepts encapsulated 
by the Metaphor sentences. However, on this account the English Dominant Bilinguals should 
also obtain metaphor interference given that they would rely more heavily on this Less Dominant 
to More Dominant conversion. However, given the perplexing nature of the Experiment 3 results 
reaching a conclusion as to which theoretical account properly characterizes bilingual memory 
representation is not possible without further investigations. 
Conclusion and Future Studies 
Bilingual figurative language processing remains a relatively unexplored terrain. The 
present study provides some interesting findings with respect to bilingualism and the possible 
influence of proficiency on figurative meaning activation. Bilinguals showed larger interference 
effects from metaphoric meanings as compared to mo nolinguals. Moreover, the metaphor 
interference effect appeared to interact with language. The exact nature of this interaction 
remains, however, to be clarified with further research. The current studies only explored 
figurative language processing with English Dominant bilinguals, therefore, future research 
should investigate how Spanish Dominant bilinguals process figurative language. Finally, it is 
hoped that the current investigation renews the interest of investigations of bilingual figurative 
language processing. 
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Table 1 
Mean Reaction Times by Stimulus Type: Experiment 1 
 n M SD 
Metaphor 33 1493.63 322.62 
Scrambled 33 1452.47 279.48 
Standard 33 1407.95 266.58 
High Typical 33 1319.10 277.44 
Low Typical 33 1448.10 277.20 
True 33 1383.60 274.34 
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Table 2 
Summary Data of the Language Background Questionnaire for English Spanish Bilinguals 
  n M SD 
English Dominant 14 6.51 1.12 
Experiment 2 
Equally Proficient 19 5.40 1.44 
English Dominant 12 6.90 .26 
Experiment 3 
Equally Proficient 14 6.56 .29 
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Table 3 
Average Reaction Time Data as a Function of Language Presentation, Bilingual Type and 
Sentence Type 
Bilingual Type n M SD 
English Dominant 14 1843.24 386.90 
Metaphor 
Equally Proficient 19 1666.16 403.05 
English Dominant 14 1768.96 360.36 
Scrambled 
Equally Proficient 19 1592.38 413.99 
English Dominant 14 1598.90 300.15 
Standard 
Equally Proficient 19 1500.86 309.40 
English Dominant 14 1566.12 243.61 
True 
Equally Proficient 19 1513.41 294.71 
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Table 4 
Reaction Time Data as a Function of Language Presentation, Bilingual Type and Sentences Type  
 Bilingual Type n M SD 
English Dominant 12 1766.50 260.88 
English Metaphor Equally Proficient 14 1695.59 421.68 
English Dominant 12 1714.75 300.19 
English Scrambled Equally Proficient 14 1605.15 271.28 
English Dominant 12 1713.27 280.37 
English Standard Equally Proficient 14 1601.72 300.87 
English Dominant 12 1548.42 153.48 
English True Equally Proficient 14 1604.32 353.43 
English Dominant 12 2441.13 430.53 
Spanish Metaphor Equally Proficient 14 2419.13 485.76 
English Dominant 12 2464.52 517.99 
Spanish Scrambled Equally Proficient 14 2326.61 472.79 
English Dominant 12 2342.00 319.67 
Spanish Standard Equally Proficient 14 2205.89 387.01 
English Dominant 12 2134.00 310.87 
Spanish True Equally Proficient 14 1997.96 292.16 
 
48 
Table 5 
Mean Reaction Times by Stimulus Type: Experiment 4 
 n M SD 
Metaphor 15 1494.45 325.13 
Scrambled 15 1377.96 327.15 
Standard 15 1346.18 161.54 
True 15 1355.50 217.10 
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Figure 1 Comparing the Metaphor Interference Effect of Monolinguals and Bilinguals 
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APPENDIX B 
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Metaphors and Scrambled Metaphors Used in Experiment 3 of Glucksberg et al., (1982) 
Metaphorical Statements Scrambled Metaphor Statements 
Some cats are detectives Some cats are chains 
Some clouds are ice cream Some clouds are detectives 
Some favors are chains Some favors are rockets 
Some feet are wheels Some feet are spotlights 
Some fingers are forks Some fingers are telescopes 
Some hallways are telescopes Some hallways are wheels 
Some hearts are dwellings Some hearts are ants 
Some ideas are food Some ideas are forks 
Some lies are clothing Some lies are ribbons 
Some lives are tapestries Some lives are clothing 
Some marriages are sports Some marriages are cotton 
Some minds are closets Some minds are worms 
Some perfumes are tools Some perfume are mirrors 
Some ponds are mirrors Some ponds are knives 
Some proverbs are spotlights Some proverbs are diseases 
Some questions are levers Some questions are tapestries 
Some roses are kisses Some roses are levers 
Some rumors are diseases Some rumors are dwellings 
Some soldiers are ants Some soldiers are food 
Some subways are worms Some subways are kisses 
Some thoughts are rockets Some thoughts are ice cream 
Some teeth are knives Some teeth are sports 
Some clouds are cotton Some clouds are tools 
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Example of Practice Stimuli Used to Familiarize the Participants with the Experimental Task 
 
Item Sentence Type 
Some girls are radios Metaphor 
Some roads are snakes Metaphor 
Some girls are zoos Scrambled Metaphor 
Some schools are snakes Scrambled Metaphor 
Some candies are poodles Standard False 
Some colors are beef Standard False 
Some buildings are apartments High 
Some buildings are hotels High 
Some colors are brown Low 
Some colors are pink Low 
Note – Half of the items were translated from English to Spanish in Experiment 3
53 
English Metaphors and their Spanish Translations 
Some cats are detectives Algunos gatos son detectives 
Some clouds are ice cream Algunas nubes son helados 
Some favors are chains Algunos favores son cadenzas 
Some feet are wheels Algunos pies son ruedas 
Some fingers are forks Algunos dedos son tenedores 
Some hallways are telescopes Algunos vestíbulos son telescopios* 
Some hearts are dwellings Algunos corazones son viviendas 
Some ideas are food Algunas ideas son alimento 
Some lies are clothing Algunas mentiras son artículos de ropa 
Some lives are tapestries Algunas vidas son tapices 
Some marriages are sports Algunos matrimonios son deportes 
Some minds are closets Algunas mentes son gabinetes 
Some perfumes are tools Algunos perfumes son herramientas 
Some ponds are mirrors Algunos estanques son espejos 
Some proverbs are spotlights Algunos proverbios son proyectores 
Some questions are levers Algunas preguntas son palancas 
Some roses are kisses Algunas rosas son besos 
Some rumors are diseases Algunos rumores son enfermedades 
Some soldiers are ants Algunos soldados son hormigas 
Some subways are worms Algunos trenes suterráneos son gusanos 
Some thoughts are rockets Algunos pensamientos son cohetes 
Some teeth are knives Algunos dientes son cuchillos 
Some clouds are cotton Algunas nubes son helados 
* Note: The word vestíbulos was replaced by the word pasillos 
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Language Background Questionnaire 
 
ID (last 5 digits):  ________ Name:_____________________ Phone #:________________________________ 
Email:____________________________ Age:____ Country of Birth:__________________________________ 
Length of Stay in U.S.: ___ years.  
Do you know any languages other than English?______________________________________(specify) 
What is your first language, i.e. what you first learned to speak first? (If more than one, state all): 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
When did you learn your other language(s)? ___ 0-4 yrs  ____ 5-8  ______ 9-12  _____ > 12  
What was/is the main language of instruction in your: 
a. Elementary School _________ 
b. Middle School _________ 
c. High School   _________ 
d. College   _________ 
 
Which hand do use to write with?________ Any left-handed family members?___________(specify)  
 
What language do you mostly use when speaking with each of the following: (If you use more than one language 
equally often, indicate that) 
a. Your Parents _________ 
b. Siblings  _________ 
c. Grandparents _________ 
d. Friends  _________ 
e. Classmates   _________ 
f. Co-workers   _________ 
g. Partner   _________ 
h. Other (specify) 
 
In which language(s) do you/would you typically do each of the following activities(If more than one language is 
used interchangeably, list all.):
a. Express affection  _________ 
b. Express anger  _________ 
c. Pray    _________ 
d. Dream   _________ 
e. Think to yourself  _________ 
f. Mentally add, multiply _________ 
 
g. Tell jokes/ funny stories _________ 
h. Listen to/read jokes  _________ 
i. Send email   _________ 
j. Curse   _________ 
k. Keep a diary (to write down your 
thoughts/feelings)  _________ 
 
In which language do you feel you can communicate most effectively? (If more than one, list all) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Circle one: "When speaking with other bilinguals I switch between languages during a conversation:" 
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently All the time Not Applicable
 
Please rate your language ability in English and your other language (specify) on a 7 point scale where 1=very little 
knowledge and 7=use it like a native speaker: 
Speak English  _________ 
Read English  _________ 
Write English  _________ 
Understand English _________ 
Speak Other language  ____________ 
Read Other   ____________ 
Write Other   ____________ 
Understand Other   ____________ 
 
Please check as appropriate: "My general comprehension of English is":  
 
___ As good as that in my _______________(specify other language). 
 
___ Better than that in my _______________(specify other language). 
 
___ Worse than that in my _______________(specify other language). 
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